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The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ended the nation's largest cash assistance program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] ) and replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The new legislation has sought to end dependence on public assistance by "promoting job preparation, work and marriage." To early critics of the bill, "the end of welfare as we know it" was a legislative calamity, one that would bring new material hardships and social injustice to America's most vulnerable and innocent populationchildren living with low-income, single mothers. These early fears have not materialized. Rather than rising, the poverty rate among America's children, although still high, fell in 1998 to its lowest level (18.9 percent) in almost 20 years.
Welfare reform happened at a propitious time. The United States began the twenty-first century in the midst of its longest economic expansion in modern economic history. The average unemployment rate of 4.2 percent in 1999 reached its lowest point in 30 years, while inflation remained low, at 2 percent to 3 percent per annum. Single mothers entered the labor force in record numbers, and welfare caseloads dropped by about 50 percent since 1993. After stagnating for decades, inflation-adjusted earnings also began to rise in the late 1990s, even among the least educated and skilled, and the rise in income inequality halted or even reversed. Optimism about the strong economy, along with the ride upward in the stock market, fueled public confidence in America's economic future.
Unfortunately, the national euphoria sometimes caused us to forget that all people and places did not share in the benefits of recent economic growth and rising personal incomes. National statistics tend to hide growing spatial inequality and "pockets of poverty" in an increasingly urban, bicoastal, and high-tech U.S. economy. Indeed, with federal devolution (including state welfare reform) and regional economic restructuring, some observers fear a growing economic, social, and cultural balkanization (Lobao, Rulli, and Brown 1999; Massey 1996) . By almost any standard, for example, rural America continues to be an economic backwater, and it faces new challenges in today's increasingly global and high-tech economy (Andrews and Burke 1999; Purdy 1999) . Unlike urban America, rural America has been buffeted by a periodically depressed farm economy; a shift away from extractive industries (such as timber and mining, especially in Appalachia); severe competition from cheap labor overseas in the manufacturing sector; in the southern "black belt," the continuing economic legacy of the old slave and plantation economy; and, on Indian reservations, government policy regarding tribal affairs and governance (Duncan 1992; Marks et al. 1999 ).
Rural problems are largely invisible to many Americans. Most people reside in or around heavily populated metropolitan cities and therefore are exposed largely to urban culture and values, urban media and marketing, and urban problems and politics. The apparent lack of public awareness about rural issues is reflected in the new welfare bill and its goal to reduce the welfare dependency of poor, single mothers. It is largely a product of an urban political and cultural legislative agenda: to reduce the dependence of poor and disproportionately minority single mothers and their children on government "handouts" by promoting work and reducing unmarried childbearing. However, the family circumstances, labor market conditions, and barriers to maternal employment (i.e., stigma, lack of adequate child care) are decidedly different in rural than in urban America. How have single mothers with children fared over the past decade in rural America? Have they been largely bypassed by a strong urban economy? Have single mothers and children-the prime targets of state welfare reform-been helped or hurt economically?
In this chapter, we examine the economic trajectories and changing sources of income among female-headed families during the recent period of economic expansion and welfare policy changes. We have three specific objectives. First, we evaluate trends in nonmetropolitan (nonmetro) and metropolitan (metro) poverty rates among female-headed families between 1989 and 1999. Second, we examine recent changes in the "income packaging" of poor and nonpoor female heads with children. Are they more reliant on earnings and less dependent on welfare income today than in the pre-TANF period? Third, we evaluate the ameliorative effects of public assistance and work on poverty rates among female-headed families. Is welfare income more or less likely than in the past to lift poor, rural families out of poverty, and are employed female heads of household more or less likely to be poor? We use pooled data from the March annual demographic supplements (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) of the Current Population Survey.
RURAL POVERTY AND WELFARE REFORM TODAY
In 1968, the President's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty reported that "[r]ural poverty is so widespread, and so acute, as to be a national disgrace" (U.S. National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty 1968). Over 30 years later, this conclusion rings less true. The nonmetro poverty rate in 1967 was 20.2 percent, roughly twice the rate of metro areas (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999a). Today, the nonmetro poverty rate is 14.4 percent, a figure only slightly higher than the metro rate of 12.3 percent and less than the rate in metro central cities (18.5 percent). America's rural population has experienced substantial reductions (roughly one-third) in the official poverty rate over the past three decades. Moreover, predominantly rural states-Iowa (2.5 percent), New Hampshire (2.7 percent), and South Dakota (2.9 percent)-enjoy some of the lowest unemployment rates in the country (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000). Clearly, rural residents have, on balance, caught up with the rest of the nation on several key policy indicators of economic well-being. Such optimism, howev-er, should not distract from evaluating other behavioral adaptations (e.g., doubling-up, migration, welfare dependence) to time-limited welfare among the people left behind, including low-income, single mothers in rural areas.
Rural Pockets of Poverty
The immediate and longer-term consequences of rural welfare reform are ambiguous, largely because they are likely to be different for different geographic and demographic segments of the population (Marks et al. 1999) . Economic indicators based on statistical averages for people, often classified based on increasingly outdated or obsolete geographic concepts (like nonmetro or rural), may hide growing spatial inequality within and between metro and nonmetro areas. Indeed, the current period of massive federal devolution, regional economic restructuring, and economic bifurcation has coincided with growing economic and cultural diversity in America, including emerging spatial inequalities among geographic areas. This is clearly reflected in large differences in income and poverty across the states. Not surprisingly, among the six states with the highest average poverty rates during 1997-1999, five were predominantly rural states, including New Mexico (poverty rate of 20.8 percent), Louisiana (18.2 percent), Mississippi (16.7 percent), West Virginia (16.7 percent), and Arkansas (16.4 percent). These figures are played out in the 1999 Kids Count project, which ranked the rural states of Mississippi, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Alabama as the nation's worst on 10 measures of children's well-being (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2000) . These are also states with heavy concentrations of rural minorities, who suffer disproportionately high rates of poverty.
Accelerated inequality also may now be occurring in nonmetro areas, but with decidedly less attention or policy concern. Income and employment differences have grown between thriving rural population growth centers (e.g., based on recreational development or other natural amenities) and other persistently poor and economically depressed backwater regions and rural ghettos (e.g., the Mississippi Delta, Appalachia, and the lower Rio Grande Valley) (Lyson and Falk 1992; Fossett and Seibert 1997; Harvey et al., in this volume, p. 375) . Growing spatial inequality is reflected in the emergence of "rural ghetto com-munities," "pockets of poverty," and "persistent low-income areas" (Brown and Warner 1989; Weinberg 1987) . Some depressed rural communities have become the "dumping grounds" for urban refuse, prisons, and low-level radioactive materials (Fitchen 1991; Duncan and Lamborghini 1994) .
The result is that current low unemployment rates in many rural states often coincide with substantial economic hardship in small towns and the countryside. In Iowa, for example, the low average unemployment rate of 2.2 percent masks the fact that the highest unemployment rates are found in thinly populated areas of the state and those dependent on agriculture (Conger and Elder 1994) . For example, Decatur County, a largely rural and agricultural area in south central Iowa, had an unemployment rate of 5.1 percent in 1998 . In rural West Virginia, unemployment rates also are well above state and national averages, especially in many depressed coal mining regions, such as McDowell, Clay, and Webster counties, where as many as one in five men are without jobs and looking for work (McLaughlin, Lichter, and Matthews 1999) .
Rural Workers and Rural Labor Markets
Rural labor markets and workers are different in ways that, on the surface, militate against achieving the stated welfare-to-work goals in the 1996 welfare bill. One point of view stresses the chronic problem of rural human resource development, including the historically low levels of education and job skills among rural workers. The other side locates the problem in labor market structure and processes (e.g., globalization) and the absence of good rural jobs-those that pay a decent or family wage-in the new information economy (Flynt 1996; Lichter, Johnston, and McLaughlin 1994) .
To be sure, rural areas suffer from chronic shortages of human capital (Jensen and McLaughlin 1995) . This problem has been exacerbated by longstanding patterns of migration of the "best and brightest" from nonmetro to metro areas (Lichter, McLaughlin, and Cornwell 1995; Garasky 2000) . Among those at the prime age for working and building a family (ages 25-44), only 16.3 percent of nonmetro persons in 1998 had attained a bachelor's degree or higher (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999b). In metro areas, the comparable rate was 29.1 percent.
For the population aged 18 and older, almost one-quarter of the nonmetro population failed to complete high school, compared with 16 percent in metro areas.
These educational deficits in rural areas are striking, especially in persistently poor regions. In the 399 counties of Appalachia, for example, more than 30 percent of the population over age 25 has less than a high school education (McLaughlin, Lichter, and Matthews 1999) . In Kentucky-the heart of Appalachia-60 percent or more of that population in five rural counties did not complete high school. Out-migration has fueled the problem. Between 1985 and 1990, economically distressed counties in Appalachia experienced a net out-migration rate of 3.81 per 100 among those with a college education and a net in-migration rate of 3.09 among high school dropouts. Migration patterns have reinforced existing patterns of spatial inequality (Lichter, McLaughlin, and Cornwell 1995; Nord, Luloff, and Jensen 1995) .
The problem, however, cannot be easily reduced to poorly skilled or unproductive workers alone. The currently low unemployment rates suggest that rural residents suffer less from having no jobs than from having jobs that pay poorly. The unfavorable sectoral mix of industries (i.e., extractive, low-wage manufacturing, etc.) places even the most skilled and educated rural workers at a competitive disadvantage. Rural workers are less likely to be unionized. They also are often dependent on single industries or companies for employment, which subjects them to the unexpected vicissitudes or downturns in the local economy. Not surprisingly, compared with metro areas, a larger percentage of the rural poor include a working head, while a disproportionate share of workers in nonmetro areas are poor Brown and Hirschl 1995) . At every level of education, average earnings and income are lower in nonmetro than in metro areas (Rural Sociological Society Task Force on Persistent Rural Poverty 1993; Jensen and McLaughlin 1995) . Findeis and Jensen (1998) reported that, in 1993, the rate of underemployment (i.e., unemployment, involuntary part-time employment, and low-income workers) was 22.6 percent in nonmetro areas, 21.5 percent in metro central cities, and 15.6 percent in the suburban ring. The substantive implication is clear: rural residents suffer less from unemployment than from myriad forms of underemployment (Lichter and Costanzo 1987) . Now, more than ever, it is important to monitor the labor force experiences of poor and single moth-ers, those most affected by time-limited welfare reform, low job skills or experience, and depressed rural labor market conditions.
Rural Families
The PRWORA legislation seeks to balance the right of welfare receipt with the recipient's obligation to behave responsibly-to stay in school, to avoid premarital pregnancy and childbearing, and to work. Indeed, an explicit goal of the welfare bill is to discourage childbearing and child rearing outside of two-parent families. Based on the conventional wisdom of strong family and kinship ties in rural America, the assumption-an inappropriate and often erroneous one-is that these welfare provisions may be less germane for rural areas. At the same time, rural women and children have not been immune to the larger cultural and societal forces that arguably have undermined traditional family life (McLaughlin, Gardner, and Lichter 1999) . As in urban cities, the past two decades have brought more teen childbearing, more female headship, more unmarried cohabitation, and more divorce (Lichter and Eggebeen 1992; Jensen and Eggebeen 1994) .
Such unexpected similarity between contemporary nonmetro and metro families is easily demonstrated. In 1998, nearly one in five (i.e., 19.8 percent) of all U.S. families with children lived in nonmetro areas (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998). Female-headed families are nearly proportionately represented in nonmetro areas (18.4 percent). Despite considerably different racial, cultural, and economic environments, rural families are more like urban families (in structure) than they are different. Moreover, the mean number of children per female-headed family was 1.87 in nonmetro areas and 1.83 in metro areas.
Clearly, the common view of a unique, even idyllic, rural family life is inappropriate. Racial breakdowns support much the same conclusion. Among whites, 17.3 percent of metro families and 17.4 percent of nonmetro families were headed by females; the corresponding figures for blacks were 54.1 percent and 46.2 percent; for Hispanics, the figures were 25.5 percent and 21.3 percent. These data reveal familiar racial differences, but they also reinforce a clear message of substantial, overall rural/urban similarity within specific racial and ethnic groups.
The question is not whether "pro-family" welfare policies are ap-propriately targeted to unmarried mothers and children. Rather, it is whether state TANF proposals will naively or unwittingly embrace the conventional wisdom of traditional rural family life and therefore direct their program energies and allocate their funds (i.e., provisions for day care, transportation services, and abstinence programs) disproportionately to big city populations at the expense of rural areas. This would be unfortunate. Child poverty rates were higher in rural than urban areas (24.4 percent vs. 22.3 percent) in 1996, while rates of "affluence" revealed the opposite pattern, with 24.8 percent of nonmetro children and 39.2 percent of metro children living in families with incomes 300 percent or more above the poverty threshold (Dagata 1999) . Poverty rates among rural children living with single mothers are higher than in urban areas (Lichter and Eggebeen 1992) , and a larger percentage of poor children are in "deep poverty," that is, living in families with incomes below 50 percent of the poverty threshold (Dagata 1999). Furthermore, the ameliorative effect of public assistance (the ability of welfare income to lift families with children above the poverty line) is lower in rural than in urban areas (Jensen and Eggebeen 1994) . The policy implication is clear. Welfare policy has historically been less appropriately targeted and less effective in rural areas. Whether the same conclusion now applies in the new welfare policy environment is uncertain. What is clear is that rural women and children have been overrepresented among the poor and underrepresented among those receiving government income assistance.
DATA
This study examines recent changes in poverty and income packaging (including welfare receipt and income) in the United States over the past decade. We use pooled data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1989 through 1999. Each March demographic supplement of CPS includes nationally representative information on the civilian, noninstitutionalized population residing in approximately 60,000 housing units each year.
The 1990s represent an important period in U.S. economic history. It includes an economic downturn and (comparatively) high unemploy-ment at the beginning of the decade, ending with subsequent economic expansion and low unemployment later in the 1990s. Welfare caseloads also rose significantly (before 1993) and then declined even more rapidly as the decade progressed. The 1990s also brought significant new legislation, including increases in the minimum wage, rapid expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the end of AFDC, and the implementation of state TANF programs. Between 1992 and 1996, many states also actively experimented with public assistance programs through the federal welfare waiver process (Schoeni and Blank 2000) .
Our analyses center on female-headed families, although we also include some comparative information on other family types. Femaleheaded families with children are the primary "targets" of the new welfare legislation; they receive the overwhelming share of public assistance and they have historically experienced exceptionally high rates of poverty. They also represent an increasing share of all family households, and, unlike in the 1960s, most poor children today in the United States now live in female-headed families (Lichter 1997) .
The analytic advantage of the March CPS is that it provides comparable social and economic data from year to year. For our purpose, we can distinguish between families residing in metro and nonmetro areas. Metro areas include one or more economically integrated counties that meet specific population size thresholds (e.g., including a large city [a central city] of 50,000 or more). Nonmetro is a residual category. In 1998, the Census Bureau estimated a nonmetro population of 55 million, or 20.3 percent of the U.S. population.
How best to measure poverty has been a topic of much debate. The official poverty income threshold (for families of various sizes) can be criticized on a number of counts: it miscalculates family economies of scale (i.e., equivalence scales); it fails to take into account in-kind government transfers (e.g., food stamps); it does not account for geographic variations in cost of living or consumption; it is based on family rather than household income; and it does not adjust for taxes or other nonconsumption expenditures, such as child support payments (Citro and Michael 1995; Short et al. 1999 ). How such issues distort rural-urban comparisons is difficult to tell, although the available evidence suggests that the cost of living is lower in rural areas, if housing costs are adjusted (Nord 2000) . At the same time, data from the 1998 Consumer Expenditure Survey indicate that rural residents spend a larger percent-age of their incomes on food, utilities, transportation, and health care than their metro counterparts (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000; see also discussion by Nord 2000) .
We cannot resolve such long-standing debates here. For our purposes, we mainly restrict our analyses to the official poverty measure, which is the basis of eligibility for a number of government programs and is available annually in the March CPS files. We recognize the limitations of our approach and, therefore, include caveats when appropriate, as well as relevant supplemental data (e.g., adjustments for the EITC or food stamps).
A complete description of poverty measurement is provided elsewhere (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999b). Poverty income thresholds are based on annual money income in the calendar year that preceded the March CPS interview; for example, the March 1999 survey asks about income from various sources in 1998. We focus on income from earnings and government transfers (including welfare recipients). Compared with administrative records, most survey data-including data from the CPS-typically underestimate the extent of welfare participation, although the substantive implications of such bias appear to be minor (Schoeni and Blank 2000) .
FINDINGS Trends in Family Poverty
Differences between metro and nonmetro areas
We begin by reporting official poverty rates for primary families with children younger than age 18 (Figure 3 .1). We also track adjusted poverty rates that include the additional income received from the EITC. These data show that poverty among families with children generally rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s, peaked in 1994, and then began to decline, reaching its lowest level in 1999. This was true in both nonmetro and metro areas, using both the official and EITC-adjusted poverty rate.
These data also indicate that welfare reform has not resulted in in- creased poverty among single-parent families with children, as many earlier critics of PRWORA had expected. Indeed, poverty rates have declined since the welfare bill was passed in 1996. Although family poverty rates remain higher in nonmetro than in metro areas, there is little indication that the economic well-being of rural families with children has diverged significantly from their metro counterparts. In 1999, the EITC-adjusted poverty rate in nonmetro areas was slightly more than 10 percent higher than in metro areas. In 1994, when poverty rates were at their peak, the nonmetro EITC-adjusted poverty rate exceeded the metro rate by 8.3 percent.
Poverty among female-headed families
As shown in Table 3 .1, poverty rates among nonmetro femaleheaded families have been very high historically (well above 40 per-NOTE: Official poverty rate adjusted for earned income credit. Not available in 1989-1991. cent) and typically have exceeded the poverty rates of married-couple families by a factor of 4 or 5. Although the 1989-1999 nonmetro poverty trend for female-headed families is more volatile than the trend for all families (Figure 3.1) , it generally points to lower poverty in the post-welfare-reform era than in the years immediately preceding reform. The official poverty rate for female-headed families in nonmetro areas dropped nearly 13 percent between 1997 and 1999, from 48.5 percent to 42.2 percent. The comparable decline in metro areas was less than 7 percent. Whether the decline is due mostly to welfare reform is debatable. Compared with the pre-TANF period, official poverty rates also declined after 1996 among married-couple families, despite the fact that such families typically are ineligible for transfer income under the new welfare bill. Table 3 .1 also includes poverty estimates adjusted for the EITC. Not surprisingly, these adjusted estimates amplify the observed downward trends in poverty; that is, the downward trend in poverty is stronger in light of the expansion of EITC since 1992. For example, the adjusted poverty rate in nonmetro areas declined from 48.6 percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 1999 among female-headed families. This 28 percent reduction in adjusted poverty rates in nonmetro areas exceeds the 16 percent reduction observed when using the official poverty rate. Moreover, even after EITC adjustments, the poverty rate remains higher in nonmetro than metro areas, both among female-headed families and families headed by married couples. Despite prognostications to the contrary, we find little evidence that the economic well-being of nonmetro and metro areas diverged since the implementation of TANF.
Sources of Income and Income Packaging
Earnings, public assistance income, and food stamps Our next objective is to examine the changing sources of income in poor, female-headed families. Table 3 .2 lists the percentage of all poor single mothers with earnings, public assistance, and food stamps for both nonmetro and metro areas. It also lists the median income received from each source.
1
These data suggest several conclusions. Perhaps the most striking is that the percentage of poor female heads with earnings rose sharply 1989-99. in nonmetro areas after the mid 1990s, and especially after PRWORA. Although 59 percent had at least some earnings at mid decade, more than 70 percent reported earnings by 1999. This is a remarkable upswing in a short period of time, especially because it occurred at the same time that poverty rates among female-headed families also declined.
The evidence that more poor women are working today than in the past has multiple interpretations, some benign, others less so. The benign view is that low-income female heads are now "playing by the rules" by seeking economic independence through employment. The welfare bill has accomplished its goal of moving a significant share of poor mothers into the labor force. The less benign view is that, despite working more, a large share of nonmetro single mothers and their children remain poor, and they are poor even as their average real earnings increased from $3,835 to $6,131 across the 1989-1999 period.
Poor rural women are arguably doing their part. The government's response, however, is reflected in the declining percentage of poor, nonmetro female heads who receive public assistance, from 65 percent in 1989 to 40.5 percent in 1999, and the declining real dollar value of welfare income (from $4,092 to $3,216 between 1989-1999) . Food stamp receipt among the poor also declined during the past decade, from 73.3 percent in 1989 to 57.3 percent in 1999, although the median dollar value of food stamp receipt inched upward. Clearly, these women remain poor because any gains from work have been offset by losses from public assistance income. Of course, we recognize that some of the employment and earnings increases reflect salutary responses to other government policy initiatives, including the EITC.
For the most part, these rural trends in "income packaging" mirror national and metro patterns. The results nevertheless indicate clear and persistent differences between metro and nonmetro single female heads in their reliance on earnings and welfare. Poor, rural, single mothers are more likely than their urban counterparts to have earnings (71.5 percent vs. 65.4 percent in 1999) and the average dollar value of their earnings is greater ($6,131 vs. $5,862).
2 They are less likely to receive public assistance income (40.5 percent vs. 48.7 percent) and food stamps (57.3 percent vs. 62.2 percent). The dollar value of public assistance also is slightly lower for rural single mothers ($3,216 vs. $3,768) . Rural single mothers are more likely than their metro counter-parts to "play by the rules," yet a higher percentage were poor in 1999 (42.4 percent vs. 38.6 percent).
Based on available evidence, it is perhaps premature to make strong conclusions about different effects of PRWORA in metro and nonmetro areas. However, the early figures are instructive and are worth monitoring, especially as the full implications of PRWORA are revealed in the years ahead. Between 1996 and 1999, the percentage of poor female heads with earnings increased by 22 percent in metro areas and by 14 percent in nonmetro areas. The receipt of public assistance among poor female heads dropped by 21 percent in metro areas and by 31 percent in nonmetro areas. For metro areas, this means that declines in welfare receipt have been matched by similar increases in employment. The story is different in rural areas. The large drop in welfare receipt swamps the comparatively small increases in employment growth (i.e., 31 percent vs. 14 percent). The apparent policy implication is that rural mothers are leaving welfare without corresponding increases in work.
Income packaging
The preceding analyses provided information about income from various sources. However, as shown in Figure 3 .2, the sources of income can be packaged differently over time and place among nonmetro, poor, female-headed families. If welfare reform has had an impact on poor, female-headed families, we should expect that earnings represent an increasing share of family income, while welfare income will decline, on average.
The results confirm this expectation. For poor, female-headed families with children, earnings, on average, accounted for 34.9 percent of family income in 1989, while public assistance income represented 45 percent of money income. Ten years later, earnings provided a substantially larger share of family income (54.1 percent) than did public assistance income (30.5 percent). Clearly, poor, single mothers living in rural areas are less likely to be dependent on welfare income.
In general, trends in income packaging-more reliance on earnings and less on welfare-are observed in both nonmetro and metro areas (data not shown). Both metro and nonmetro areas experienced a 20 percentage point increase in the share of income from earnings over the 1989-1999 period. However, there are also several interesting metro/ nonmetro differences. For example, welfare income is much lower as a percentage of family income among rural (versus urban) poor, femaleheaded families with children (23.8 percent for rural mothers vs. 32 percent in 1999 for urban mothers). Despite efforts to insure child support payments from so-called "deadbeat dads," child support (and alimony) constituted a very small share of family income in 1999, although this figure is slightly higher than observed in the late 1980s. In rural areas, however, child support and alimony accounted for roughly twice the share of family income as in metro areas (9.4 percent vs. 4.5 percent), and this differential has grown over the past decade. One explanation is that rural single mother families with children are more likely to be products of divorce rather than nonmarital childbearing. Divorced fathers are more likely than never-married fathers to be involved with their children, to be employed, and to make child support payments (Garfinkel and Oellerich 1989) . Our results on income packaging among poor women must be in-terpreted with caution. They reflect, at least in part, changes over time in the choices all female heads make regarding work and welfare, choices that ultimately affect the size and composition of the population of single mothers with children in the home. To address this potential endogeneity problem, we have also examined income packaging among all female heads over the 1989-1999 period. As with poor female heads, the share of all nonmetro female heads with earnings reached its peak in 1999 (at 85.9 percent), while the proportion receiving public assistance (22.1 percent) or food stamps (31.3 percent) were at their nadir, at least for the period considered here. Moreover, Figure  3 .3 provides the cumulative shares of income by source for all nonmetro female heads. These data reinforce the conclusions based on poor female heads in rural areas. That is, the share of all family income from earnings has increased substantially over the past decade, and especially since TANF, while the share of income from public assistance has declined from 25 percent to 11.3 percent between 1989 and 1999. The Ameliorative Effects of Public Assistance and Work
Economic well-being among single mother families
The declining welfare receipt and share of family income from public assistance suggest that the ameliorative effects of public assistance-whether it lifts families above the poverty threshold-may have declined over the past decade (Jensen and Eggebeen 1994) . It also begs the question of whether an increasing share of poor, female heads are poorer in absolute terms (e.g., declines in the median income-to-poverty ratio). To address this issue, we calculate, for each female-headed family, the ratio of family income to the appropriate poverty income threshold (IPR).
3 Figure 3 .4 charts the median IPR for all single mother families and for the poor in both nonmetro and metro areas. We also present a measure of deep poverty, which is defined by the percentage of all single mother families that are living below 50 percent of the official poverty threshold (Figure 3.5) .
In general, the IPRs for all single mother families have increased slightly since the mid 1990s, both in nonmetro and metro areas. For example, in 1994, rural female heads had family incomes that were 1.29 times their poverty rates, a figure lower than that observed in metro areas. This means that the average income of female heads was 29 percent higher than the poverty income threshold. By 1999, the income-to-poverty ratio had climbed to 1.45 in nonmetro areas and to 1.80 in metro areas. If we adjust for the EITC, these figures increase slightly to 1.55 and 1.88. Although rural female heads are worse off than their metro counterparts, they nevertheless have more family-sizeadjusted income after TANF than before.
The situation among the poor, single mothers is different. Regardless of residence, the average income of poor, single, female heads showed no improvement, remaining at roughly 0.50 throughout the 1989-1999 period. This also means that poor, female-headed families fell farther behind the average female-headed family income over the decade; that is, inequality increased among female-headed families. At the same time, the rate of deep poverty declined over this period, from 26.9 percent in 1989 to 19.2 percent in 1999 among nonmetro female heads, and from 23.3 percent to 18.9 percent among metro female heads (Figure 3 .5). Because most deeply impoverished female heads are not employed, any adjustments for EITC have little or no effect on our estimates.
Public assistance income and poverty
To what extent has public assistance income, both before and after TANF, improved the economic well-being of female family heads? In Table 3 .3, we evaluate the ameliorative effects of public assistance. Among those whose income without welfare (public assistance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)) is below the official poverty threshold, we calculate the percentage whose income when including welfare assistance with post-welfare income falls above that threshold (data column 1). In a similar way, we also calculate the ameliorative effects of public assistance income on deep poverty (data column 2); that is, for families with incomes below one-half the official poverty threshold when welfare income is excluded, we calculate the percentage that rise above the deep-poverty line when welfare income is added back in with other income. Finally, we estimate the percentage of the pre-welfare-income poverty gap (i.e., the difference between the poverty threshold and pre-welfare income) that is closed by public assistance (data column 3). This measure is restricted to those whose pre-welfare income is less than the official threshold, and it is forced to equal 100 percent when post-welfare income exceeds the poverty threshold.
The time trends indicate that the ameliorative effects of public assistance income have not only been modest, but may have deteriorated slightly since PRWORA. For example, among nonmetro female heads, the ameliorative effect of public assistance on poverty grew over much of the early 1990s, peaking at 6.6 percent in 1996. The appropriate interpretation is that 6.6 percent of those whose pre-welfare income was below the official poverty income threshold were lifted from poverty by the receipt of welfare income. By 1999, the ameliorative effect of public assistance had declined to 4 percent. This finding apparently re- flects the declining percentage who receive assistance, and continuing declines in the amount of public assistance received by poor, femaleheaded families. The ameliorative effects of public assistance on poverty have generally been smaller in nonmetro than metro America. The nonmetro disadvantage is seen most clearly with the first (poverty threshold) and third (poverty gap) measures of amelioration. For example, in nonmetro areas, the poverty gap measure declined by 36 percent between 1996 and 1999, while in metro areas the decline was 28 percent. The ameliorative effects of public assistance on deep poverty also were substantial and favored metro residents until the late 1990s. In 1999, a larger percentage of nonmetro than metro female heads were brought out of deep poverty by the receipt of public assistance.
Our results must be interpreted in light of significant expansions over the last decade in the EITC. For example, if we treat the EITC as public assistance income, 20.6 percent (rather than 4 percent) of nonmetro, poor female heads are lifted out of poverty, and 33.1 percent (rather than 28 percent) are no longer deeply impoverished. The percentage of the pre-welfare poverty gap that is closed increases dramatically, from 17.5 percent to 47.1 percent if EITC is treated as public assistance. More important, the ameliorative effects of public assistance (including EITC) increased substantially over the past decade. Whereas 8.1 percent of rural female heads were lifted from poverty in 1992 as a result of public assistance and EITC, 20.6 percent were helped out of poverty in 1999. This is nearly identical to the figure observed in metro areas (21 percent). When TANF income is considered along with income supports (through EITC), the improving salutary effects on poverty are clear.
Work and poverty
As we have shown, female heads of household in rural areas are less dependent on welfare income, now more than any time in recent memory. Many have moved successfully from welfare to work. However, what are the ameliorative effects of maternal employment on poverty in rural areas? Does employment lift them out of poverty? We address this question in Table 3 .4, which lists poverty rates for working and nonworking single female heads. As with the measure of annual 
CPS
NonNonTotal income and poverty, employment status in the March CPS is based on work-related activities during the previous year. For our purposes, we distinguish between those working full-time, full-year, those working part-time or part-year (other), and those not working at all. 4 These data yield several general observations. First and foremost is the fact that work clearly matters in the economic lives of rural single mothers (Table 3 .4, left-most four columns). In 1999, for example, the poverty rate among all working female heads was 35 percent, compared with 78.8 percent among their nonworking counterparts in nonmetro areas. The poverty rate among full-time, full-year working single mothers was still high (17.4 percent), but it was substantially lower than for nonworkers and part-time workers. Not surprisingly, the benefits from work are even greater if we adjust income upward for the EITC. Such adjustments suggest that only 8.3 percent of nonmetro female heads who worked full-time were poor in 1999. Interpreted differently, the EITC cuts the official poverty rate in half.
Our results also indicate that the economic benefits from employment have changed very little over the 1990s in nonmetro areas. The poverty rate among rural employed single moms fluctuated between roughly 35 percent and 40 percent over the past decade. That poverty rates remained constant among workers, amid an overall decline in poverty, suggests that recent declines in poverty among all female heads largely resulted from increasing labor force participation rather than from increased remuneration from work. At the same time, the poverty rate among nonworkers, although typically exceeding 80 percent, has trended downward slightly since welfare reform. One interpretation is that the "truly disadvantaged" are more likely to be helped today-albeit only marginally more so-in the currently tougher welfare environment.
Although some additional analyses (not reported) reveal that a larger share of poor nonmetro than metro female heads are working (68.6 percent of poor nonmetro vs. 62.2 percent of poor metro) and working full-time (21 percent vs. 15.4 percent), this does not result from greater incentives or remuneration from work in rural areas. In fact, work tends to pay less in nonmetro areas (Table 3 .4). For each year, poverty rates are higher among rural, working, female heads than among their urban counterparts, although this differential has declined somewhat over the past decade. In 1999, 35 percent of working, rural single mothers were poor compared with 29.2 percent in metro areas. For full-time workers, the figures were 17.4 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively, in nonmetro and metro areas. Although the poverty rate among working female heads was nearly 20 percent higher in nonmetro than metro areas, this represents substantial convergence since 1989 when the nonmetro rate was over 50 percent higher than the metro rate. Declines in the urban advantage are not altered appreciably if we adjust income upward for the EITC.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The PRWORA of 1996 ended the nation's largest cash assistance program (AFDC) for needy, single-parent families. Many of the early forecasts about the putative effects of the new legislation on poor children have not materialized. Indeed, most indicators of "success" have painted a rather rosy picture: declining welfare caseloads, a dip in poverty rates for female-headed families with children, and rising labor force participation rates (and, supposedly, rising economic independence) among unmarried mothers with children. The question today is largely one of identifying specific population groups that have been helped or hurt most by state welfare reform policies (i.e., TANF).
In this spirit, our goal has been to evaluate recent economic trends among America's largely forgotten rural families and children. Specifically, we have focused on changes in labor force behavior and welfare participation of rural, single mother families, who often remain invisible in the national debate about welfare reform. However, rural mothers-especially poor single mothers-face many barriers to employment that seem incongruent with current legislative mandates that emphasize time limits on receipt and that require recipients to find work or face sanctions. Whether such an agenda is practical or realistic in isolated rural areas is an empirical question, one that we have taken up in this chapter. Indeed, the longstanding problems of limited job skills and education, depressed labor markets, poor transportation, and inadequate child care pose serious barriers to adequate employment among many rural women (Rural Sociological Task Force on Persistent Rural Poverty 1993). They also may vitiate against successful welfare reform in rural areas.
Our analysis, however, revealed some unexpected, but welcome, surprises during the period since PRWORA; trends that provide reasons for optimism about the state of rural America. In general, rural mothers and their children have not been "left behind" in the new welfare policy and economic environment. For the most part, recent trends in rural poverty, earnings, and welfare receipt have followed national patterns. During the past decade, but especially since welfare reform was introduced nationally in 1996, rural poverty rates (including deep poverty) have declined among female-headed families, rates of welfare receipt have dropped dramatically, and labor force participation has increased along with average earnings. Moreover, the income of all rural, female-headed families with children increased, on average, over the past few years, and even more if we add income from the EITC. The early, gloomy forecasts have not matched the empirical record, at least not to date. Instead, our data have provided a measure of hope for rural families, and, more important, have indicated that the "new" economy and the "end of welfare" have not seriously undermined the economic gains made by rural women over the past generation or more.
Our data nevertheless also tell the familiar story of persistent ruralurban inequality in the lives of single mothers and their children (Friedman and Lichter 1998; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990 ). About 7.5 million poor people live in rural areas, and rural poverty rates continue to exceed those in urban areas (Dalaker 1999) . In 1999, for example, about 42 percent of rural, female-headed families were poor, and about one-half of these had incomes less than one-half the poverty threshold. This happened even though the share of rural female heads who were employed grew and continued to exceed their urban counterparts. In addition, rural/urban differences in poverty occurred despite higher average earnings among rural female heads; median earnings of rural women were about $6,131 in 1998, compared with $5,862 among urban women. More than most, rural single mothers have played by the new rules seeking to balance welfare receipt with personal responsibility and work. The problem today for most poor rural mothers is finding a good job that pays a living wage. Over one-third of working rural female heads are in poverty, a rate higher than at any time during the pe-riod examined here. Increases in poverty rates among working, rural, female heads occurred hand-in-hand with the rising proportion of poor female heads who are employed. It also occurred despite increases in the minimum wage and expansions to the EITC.
As in the past, rural poverty today is reinforced by comparatively low and declining rates of rural welfare receipt and the low dollar value of welfare transfers. As we have shown here, welfare reform clearly has been associated with the aggregate movement from welfare to work in rural areas. Over the past ten years, the proportions of rural single mothers with earnings from work increased dramatically. It is also true, however, that the rise in the proportion with earnings has not kept pace with the large decrease in the proportion with welfare income since the passage of PRWORA. This pattern was not apparent among metro female heads; for them, the drop in welfare receipt was offset almost entirely by the growth in earnings. Compared with metro female heads, welfare reform has hurt rural women; they have been removed from welfare without a proportionate increase in employment. This fact accounts for the larger share of family income among rural female heads that derives from employment. It also explains why the ameliorative effects of public assistance on rural poverty have declined.
Our results, supporting both optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of welfare success, seemingly provide something for everyone. As such, they also suggest a cautious approach to the evidence. Neither unbridled optimism nor pessimism about current trends can be projected into the short-or long-term future, for several reasons. Indeed, the next few years will be especially telling, as the "hardest cases" and other nonworking, welfare-dependent mothers run up against time limits for welfare receipt, or if the economy slows down and unemployment creeps up to pre-1994 levels. Moreover, static measures of welfare "success" or "failure," such as those reported here, are incomplete. Aggregate annual statistics do not represent a fixed or unchanging population but are the net product of transitions into and out of poverty and welfare dependence. Behavioral data (i.e., individual data on poverty transitions) will be required to measure the changing extent and etiology of individual adaptations to rural welfare reform, especially among hard to serve cases.
We should also be mindful that our baseline results apply to nonmetro areas as a whole; we have not examined recent changes for par-ticular rural regions, nor have we identified differences or similarities across historically disadvantaged racial or ethnic groups such as Native Americans or blacks (Swanson 1996) . Rural minorities are "doubly disadvantaged" (Jensen and Tienda 1989; Saenz and Thomas 1991) . Although our focus on employment and poverty has clear interpretive advantages (in terms of data availability over time) for rural policy, conventional measures may be less indicative today of the quality of rural life or of economic hardship generally. Underemployment is especially common in rural areas (Findeis and Jensen 1998) , and incomebased measures of family poverty may be seriously flawed, especially if the new family realities in our increasingly multicultural society are ignored. "Doubling up," adoption and fosterage, unmarried cohabitation, and multigenerational households are sometimes viewed with a jaundiced eye, a cause rather than a consequence of the problem. They might also be regarded as family survival strategies, as symptoms of poverty, or as "safety nets" for some poor women.
5 Whether rural family behavioral responses to welfare reform differ from the rest of the nation remains unclear (Struthers and Bokemeier 2000) .
Finally, our results are not meant to pit the policy and economic interests of rural and urban America against each other. The paradox today is that the forces of geographic balkanization and of globalism have occurred simultaneously. In fact, throughout this century, rural and urban areas have become increasingly integrated, culturally, politically, and economically. New information technologies (radio, television, and the internet), transportation innovations, and mass production and mass marketing bind rural and urban people and communities together and reinforce interdependence (and dependence, in some instances). For rural America, ignored or forgotten economic and social problems tend to become America's urban problems. The urban migration of displaced rural blacks from southern agriculture to northern cities, or poor whites from depressed mining areas of Appalachia, are obvious historical cases in point. This spatial relationship is hardly asymmetric. Examples include the encroachment of urban residential and commercial activity on the rural hinterland, the expansion of urban-based corporate agriculture and other business interests in rural communities, and the delivery of health and social services (e.g., medical services, social welfare, job services, etc.), which often tax the resources of urban-based government providers. What is good (or bad) for rural America is good (or bad) for urban America, and vice versa. Rural and urban communities and people increasingly share a common destiny.
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1. Median income for a given source is calculated on the basis the population of female householders with positive income from that source. For each year, median income is calibrated in 1998 dollars, using the CPI-U. 2. The higher average earnings among nonmetro, poor, female heads is more likely to reflect greater labor supply than higher wage rates. In fact, the 1999 CPS indicates that nonmetro poor women worked, on average, 25 weeks during the previous year, compared with 21.3 weeks for metro poor women. 3. If two families of different sizes have the same family income, the IPR will be lower (appropriately so) for the larger family than the smaller family because more income is needed to exceed the poverty income threshold. Thus, the income-topoverty ratio provides a useful family-size-adjusted measure of family income. It is based on the income equivalency scales implicit in the poverty thresholds for families of different sizes. 4. Keep in mind that these data are presented for each CPS year, which means that work and poverty refer to the previous year. For example, the poverty changes reported here between 1996 and 1997 actually took place 1995 and 1996. 5. Our analysis has been restricted to primary female heads with children; it does not include children and their unmarried mothers who move in with grandparents or other relatives.
